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Independent LrrK research · Edition 2026-11-01.3

Hardware Attack Library (HAL)

Hardware-first evidence for drones, robotics and embedded devices: what researchers actually showed, on which device, with what access, and what stayed unresolved. Records are organised by the hardware threat classes in MITRE EMB3D™, with ATT&CK® cross-references only where a source supports them. LrrK endorses this framework as an independent effort of the security research community and is not affiliated with or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation.

89 reviewed evidence records · 5 pending leads · 20 closed lead reviews (15 resolved to records, 3 reviewed as context only, 2 reviewed and excluded) · reviewed through 1 November 2026. Context-only reviews are background, not demonstrated attacks. Several records share a paper or experiment, so these are not 89 independent attacks. Coverage means representation in this documented corpus — not every device, attack or source on the internet.

EMB3D Framework

Counts are records in this documented corpus, including discussions and reported results; they are not independent experiments, exhaustive coverage or confirmed device applicability. Choose a threat to filter the evidence.

Reviewed evidence records

Showing 3 of 89 reviewed records for EMB3D TID-113 Unverified Peripheral Firmware Loaded. Default order: hardware, then device interface, then context; within each, drones and robotics first, then fault-injection learning.

Full archived edition (JSON) ↓
HardwarePrimary hardware researchReported resultprimary-equation-hdd-2015Equation hard-drive firmware-reprogramming modules78/100
Bounded outcome
Kaspersky reports recovered modules capable of replacing drive firmware and accessing hidden storage; this supports a reported adversarial capability, not a claim that every listed drive was observed infected.
Stated claim
Equation hard-drive firmware-reprogramming modules
Evidence status
Malware analysis report (malware_analysis_report)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: HDD firmware targeted by recovered EquationDrug/GrayFish modules; supported manufacturers vary Configuration: Kaspersky report V1.5 identifies firmware-reprogramming modules 3.0.1 and 4.2.0; PE compilation dates are explicitly uncertain.

Access required

A prior software compromise with device-specific firmware reprogramming capability; exact initial access is not established by this artifact account.

Scope / hardware boundary
Kaspersky report V1.5 identifies firmware-reprogramming modules 3.0.1 and 4.2.0; PE compilation dates are explicitly uncertain.
Dates
Published: February 2015 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date precision: month.
Mechanisms
Unverified Peripheral Firmware Loaded

Sources

Limitations

  • Recovered-code capability and proven deployment on a specific drive are different claims.
  • The single vendor investigation and MITRE citation are not independent physical reproduction.
  • Module PE timestamps are not treated as confirmed event dates.
  • Research-strand review status: AI-assisted desk review; no physical reproduction or independent human acceptance claimed.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Read original analysis, firmware-module section and qualification of compilation dates.
  • Read ATT&CK v20's direct Equation procedure reference.

Result

  • Kept observed/reported malware artifacts separate from universal drive-infection claims.

Unresolved / next

  • Confirm exact target hardware, firmware, access and mitigation state before any separate authorized assessment.

Evidence confidence · 78/100

Confidence components for primary-equation-hdd-2015
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance20/20Original source and provenance inspected.
Technical evidence29/35Technical evidence read; methods and outcome limits retained.
Configuration specificity13/20Device and configuration details are bounded; missing revisions remain unknown.
Independent corroboration8/15Independent corroboration is limited; taxonomy citation and same-team artifacts are not independent reproduction.
Follow-up resolution8/10Follow-up source checks performed; unresolved items remain explicit.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwarePrimary hardware researchDemonstrationprimary-perilous-hp-camera-2020Unsigned HP/SunplusIT camera-firmware descriptor modification74/100
Bounded outcome
Researchers verified modified USB descriptors being accepted by the device update tool. More extensive malicious HID behavior was described as a potential follow-on, not demonstrated in this specific result.
Stated claim
Unsigned HP/SunplusIT camera-firmware descriptor modification
Evidence status
Published research demonstration (published_research_demonstration)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: HP Spectre x360 Convertible 13-ap0xxx with HP Wide Vision FHD/SunplusIT USB camera Configuration: Researcher's sp93170.exe update package and camera firmware image; update acceptance lacked authenticity checks.

Access required

Local software access; the author reports that the update tool worked as a normal user.

Scope / hardware boundary
Researcher's sp93170.exe update package and camera firmware image; update acceptance lacked authenticity checks.
Dates
Published: 18 February 2020 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date precision: day.
Mechanisms
Unverified Peripheral Firmware Loaded

Sources

Shared source; these records are not independent experiments. Shared with primary-perilous-bcm5719-2020.

Limitations

  • USB-descriptor modification is not proof of the full proposed malware behavior.
  • HP mitigation work is reported by the author; current camera firmware state was not verified.
  • Research-strand review status: AI-assisted desk review; no physical reproduction or independent human acceptance claimed.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Read the camera-specific verified outcome and distinguished it from proposed behavior.

Result

  • Retained the narrow demonstrated result and normal-user prerequisite.

Unresolved / next

  • Confirm exact target hardware, firmware, access and mitigation state before any separate authorized assessment.

Evidence confidence · 74/100

Confidence components for primary-perilous-hp-camera-2020
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance20/20Original source and provenance inspected.
Technical evidence28/35Technical evidence read; methods and outcome limits retained.
Configuration specificity18/20Device and configuration details are bounded; missing revisions remain unknown.
Independent corroboration3/15Independent corroboration is limited; taxonomy citation and same-team artifacts are not independent reproduction.
Follow-up resolution5/10Follow-up source checks performed; unresolved items remain explicit.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://eclypsium.com/research/perilous-peripherals-the-hidden-dangers-inside-windows-linux-computers/ (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwarePrimary hardware researchDemonstrationprimary-perilous-bcm5719-2020Unsigned Broadcom BCM5719 NIC firmware demonstration73/100
Bounded outcome
The original research demonstrates using modified NIC firmware to inspect or alter management traffic otherwise outside the host's normal view.
Stated claim
Unsigned Broadcom BCM5719 NIC firmware demonstration
Evidence status
Published research demonstration (published_research_demonstration)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: Broadcom BCM5719 NIC in the researcher's server configuration Configuration: Unsigned host-loaded NIC firmware; BMC configured to share the NIC with the host.

Access required

Ability to modify firmware loaded to the NIC; initial compromise/firmware-write authority is a prerequisite.

Scope / hardware boundary
Unsigned host-loaded NIC firmware; BMC configured to share the NIC with the host.
Dates
Published: 18 February 2020 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date precision: day.
Mechanisms
Unverified Peripheral Firmware Loaded

Sources

Shared source; these records are not independent experiments. Shared with primary-perilous-hp-camera-2020.

Limitations

  • The report lists many potential consequences; only its demonstrated NIC behavior is presented as an observed outcome.
  • Shared-NIC BMC topology and firmware acceptance are material prerequisites.
  • Do not treat every server using a related component as confirmed affected today.
  • Research-strand review status: AI-assisted desk review; no physical reproduction or independent human acceptance claimed.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Read the specific BCM5719 demonstration, separating it from the article's broader attack possibilities.

Result

  • Recorded a concrete configuration rather than importing all vendor marketing consequences as established.

Unresolved / next

  • Confirm exact target hardware, firmware, access and mitigation state before any separate authorized assessment.

Evidence confidence · 73/100

Confidence components for primary-perilous-bcm5719-2020
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance20/20Original source and provenance inspected.
Technical evidence28/35Technical evidence read; methods and outcome limits retained.
Configuration specificity17/20Device and configuration details are bounded; missing revisions remain unknown.
Independent corroboration3/15Independent corroboration is limited; taxonomy citation and same-team artifacts are not independent reproduction.
Follow-up resolution5/10Follow-up source checks performed; unresolved items remain explicit.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://eclypsium.com/research/perilous-peripherals-the-hidden-dangers-inside-windows-linux-computers/ (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

Lead registry

Leads are sources not yet admitted as reviewed records. They carry no confidence score — null, not zero risk. 5 are pending or unresolved; 20 lead reviews are closed and listed separately.

Closed lead reviews

Pending or unresolved leads (5)
  • primary-lead-iommu-2010 Exploiting an I/OMMU vulnerability (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Companion original-source evidence materially narrows the mechanism, but neither the SSTIC paper nor the existing 2018 Dell paper silently resolves the unread IEEE 5665798 original.

    Next check: Compare a normally accessible original IEEE manuscript with the SSTIC account if one becomes available. Retain publication/experiment lineage and avoid counting both venues as independent proof without distinct outcomes.

  • DR-L06 2011 Predator/Reaper support-computer malware: conflicting public accounts (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Read additional contemporary Dark Reading coverage quoting the Air Force account: malware was described as a nuisance on a standalone mission-support network, with aircraft control reportedly unaffected. Repeated quotations are one statement chain, not independent forensic evidence. The original AF Space Command press record remains unlocated.

    Next check: Locate a normal public original AF Space Command record or authenticated official archival copy before resolving the competing accounts; retain as context, not a hardware-attack demonstration.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-001 STM32F103 voltage-glitch Reddit discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Three new targeted public origin-discovery queries, in addition to the three retained follow-up01 queries, did not establish a public original-author artifact attributable to the supplied Reddit post. The known unsupported Reddit URL was not resubmitted and no mirror was used. Search snippets and unrelated STM32-family studies remain discovery only.

    Next check: A normally accessible original-author artifact with a defensible identity connection to this post is required before claim review. Do not retry or mirror the restricted source.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-002 EEVblog STM32F4 level-2 protection discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    New captures of the first three forum pages were reviewed with the reused last-page capture. Earlier success assertions do not establish F4 RDP2: one contributor explicitly says F4 was untested and cannot identify the F3 model involved. The later RDP2 assertion still lacks an exact tested F4 part/revision, protection-state evidence and a retained validated result. Searches returned only the known assertion and the already published FEV RDP1 article.

    Next check: Require an original F4/RDP2 configuration and validated result, or a normally accessible original correction. Reconcile the uncertain ST operation before any decision to retry it; no bypass or unrequested paid repeat.

  • LRRK-LEAD-HOBOT-2026 HOBOT S7 Pro: author-reported OTA data writes need an installation-boundary follow-up (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source reviewed installation boundary gap · Confidence: not scored

    The original paper reports unauthenticated OTA data writes using non-destructive payloads. A data-transfer characteristic accepting writes does not by itself prove firmware-image installation, activation or bypass of a later signature check. Official TID-211 requires an installation/authentication boundary, so no admitted TID-211 case is proposed.

    Next check: Review a normally accessible original artifact or follow-up documenting the on-device verification/installation state, or a vendor security response; do not operate a robot or attempt firmware writes.

How to read evidence confidence

LRRK analyst evidence confidence, 0–100. Evidence strength for the narrowly stated claim, not probability, severity, present-device applicability, safety or an official MITRE score. It is an analyst rubric, not a MITRE rating.

  • Provenance · up to 20
  • Technical evidence · up to 35
  • Configuration specificity · up to 20
  • Independent corroboration · up to 15
  • Follow-up resolution · up to 10

Null means the source strand provided no separate component reason. Overall rationale is retained; no reasons are invented.

Multiple citations, reposts, same-team artifacts or shared reports are not independent reproduction.

Method, attribution and licenses

Edition
2026-11-01.3 · schema 1 · reviewed through 1 November 2026
Review
AI-assisted public-source desk research. No LRRK physical reproduction, device actuation or independent human acceptance is asserted.
Read status
Reviewed means the research strand inspected the returned source material. Partial-page reads, targeted passages, omitted forum replies and blocked content remain explicit.
Classification
evidenceStatus preserves each strand's original label. evidenceGroup is a coarse compiler grouping and never upgrades the stated outcome.
Mechanisms
Community mechanism labels are preserved. When a strand supplied no separate list, mapped EMB3D threat names are used; an empty list is not proof of no mechanism.
Mapping attribution
officialCaseAttribution=false means no verified direct MITRE attribution of this exact case is asserted. Ambiguous official-evidence inventory labels are displayed as analyst inference and their original wording is retained in mapping provenance. Only source-reviewed direct references or explicitly labeled analyst inferences. No forced EMB3D-to-ATT&CK/ICS crosswalk or MITRE endorsement.
Coverage and gaps
A documented seed corpus with open gaps, not an exhaustive census of the internet. Normal interfaces, search excerpts, HTTP success and code availability do not themselves prove attacks.
Shared sources
Records describe distinct claims or contexts. Shared papers, reports, forum topics and related artifacts do not establish independent experiments. 16 shared-source groups are flagged on their records.
What this does not establish
This snapshot does not establish exploitation on any current LRRK device. Operational reports, advisories, demonstrations, unverified reports and discussions remain distinct.
Updates
Research is reviewed weekly (Mondays, 9 AM Pacific) into private drafts. Only meaningful changes are prepared, and nothing is published automatically; this page changes only when a new reviewed edition is released. It is not a live feed.
Pinned versions
MITRE EMB3D™ site 2.0.2, model 2.0.1, commit 0d7c25bb4e2928c516fb5811aaab9ff8bab2896c (repository (opens original source in a new tab)). MITRE ATT&CK® v20.0 (13 October 2026), verified through 1 November 2026 (ATT&CK (opens original source in a new tab)).
Independence
An independent LrrK implementation. Not produced, reviewed or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation. Original sources retain their own rights; this library links to them and summarises bounded findings.
MITRE EMB3D license and disclaimers

©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. Terms of Use LICENSE The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use, copy, and create derivative works of EMB3D™ for internal business purposes or commercial use. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation and this license in any such copy and provide MITRE notice of such use at EMB3D@mitre.org. “©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.” For all other uses of EMB3D™, contact MITRE at techtransfer@mitre.org. All rights not expressly granted are hereby reserved. Portions of EMB3D™ were produced for the U.S. Government under various contracts or funded by internal research and development funds and the U.S. Government retains certain rights in EMB3D™. You agree that you shall not include a charge for EMB3D™ in any sales or license of derivative products or services to the U.S. Government. Your use of MITRE’s website and EMB3D™ will comply with all relevant laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and other obligations. DISCLAIMERS MITRE does not claim EMB3D™ enumerates all possibilities for the types of actions and behaviors documented as part of EMB3D™’s adversary model and framework of techniques. Using the information contained within EMB3D™ to address or cover full categories of techniques will not guarantee full defensive coverage as there may be undisclosed techniques or variations on existing techniques not documented by EMB3D™. EMB3D™ AND ALL DOCUMENTS AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” BASIS AND THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE MITRE CORPORATION, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES, DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION THEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ACCURACY, NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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MITRE ATT&CK license

MITRE ATT&CK® Terms of Use Source: https://attack.mitre.org/resources/legal-and-branding/terms-of-use/ Retrieved: 2026-11-01 The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use ATT&CK® for research, development, and commercial purposes. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy. "© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation." #### [DISCLAIMERS](https://attack.mitre.org/resources/legal-and-branding/terms-of-use/\#disclaimers) MITRE does not claim ATT&CK enumerates all possibilities for the types of actions and behaviors documented as part of its adversary model and framework of techniques. Using the information contained within ATT&CK to address or cover full categories of techniques will not guarantee full defensive coverage as there may be undisclosed techniques or variations on existing techniques not documented by ATT&CK. ALL DOCUMENTS AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN ARE PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE MITRE CORPORATION, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES, DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION THEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See our [FAQ](https://attack.mitre.org/resources/faq) for more information on how to use and represent the ATT&CK name.

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