Assess

Independent LrrK research · Edition 2026-11-01.3

Hardware Attack Library (HAL)

Hardware-first evidence for drones, robotics and embedded devices: what researchers actually showed, on which device, with what access, and what stayed unresolved. Records are organised by the hardware threat classes in MITRE EMB3D™, with ATT&CK® cross-references only where a source supports them. LrrK endorses this framework as an independent effort of the security research community and is not affiliated with or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation.

89 reviewed evidence records · 5 pending leads · 20 closed lead reviews (15 resolved to records, 3 reviewed as context only, 2 reviewed and excluded) · reviewed through 1 November 2026. Context-only reviews are background, not demonstrated attacks. Several records share a paper or experiment, so these are not 89 independent attacks. Coverage means representation in this documented corpus — not every device, attack or source on the internet.

EMB3D Framework

Counts are records in this documented corpus, including discussions and reported results; they are not independent experiments, exhaustive coverage or confirmed device applicability. Choose a threat to filter the evidence.

Reviewed evidence records

Showing 3 of 89 reviewed records for EMB3D TID-108 ROM/NVRAM Data Extraction or Modification. Default order: hardware, then device interface, then context; within each, drones and robotics first, then fault-injection learning.

Full archived edition (JSON) ↓
HardwareDrones & roboticsDemonstrationDR-018Holy Stone HS175D and HS720: validated external-flash acquisition under physical access72/100
Bounded outcome
The preprint reports repeated, matching full-size external-flash reads for HS175D and HS720 and successful structural analysis of their contents. This establishes reported firmware readability on the tested units, not execution of a malicious image or flight control.
Stated claim
Holy Stone HS175D and HS720: validated external-flash acquisition under physical access
Evidence status
Original preprint hardware acquisition (original-preprint-hardware-acquisition)
Device, firmware & configuration

Vendor: Holy Stone Models: HS175D; HS720 Configuration: HS175D external XT25F128F-W flash, 16 MiB; HS720 XM25QH64C flash, 8 MiB. Paper reports extracted software structures, but not a vendor firmware release or board revision.

Access required

Class: physical-hardware/acquisition Requirements: Physical board access to external nonvolatile storage and suitable readout equipment; this is a laboratory acquisition experiment.

Scope / hardware boundary
Direct in-circuit reading of nonvolatile storage, crossing a physical firmware-confidentiality boundary.
Dates
Published: 11 May 2026 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026
Mechanisms
ROM/NVRAM Data Extraction or Modification

Sources

Shared source; these records are not independent experiments. Shared with DR-019, DR-020.

Limitations

  • Preprint prepared for submission; peer review and independent reproduction are not established.
  • Exact vendor firmware version and board revision absent.
  • Consistency, entropy and recognizable structures are not cryptographic authenticity or proof the entire boot chain lacks enforcement.
  • Static package/CVE identification is not a demonstrated exploitable vulnerability.

Follow-up

  • Resolved Were readable firmware contents distinguished from tool success? Yes: HS175D and HS720 reads had matching hashes and recognized boot/filesystem structures; HS360S was separately rejected as incomplete. source (opens original source in a new tab)
  • Resolved Did the study demonstrate secure-boot bypass or flight manipulation? No. Runtime integrity, anti-rollback and other subsystems were out of scope. source (opens original source in a new tab)
  • Open Are vendor-authenticated reference images available for comparison? The paper says none were available; physical readback was not independently repeated by LrrK.

Evidence confidence · 72/100

Confidence components for DR-018
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance18/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Technical evidence29/35Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Configuration specificity17/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Independent corroboration0/15Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Follow-up resolution8/10Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.

Overall rationale Original preprint supplies chips, sizes, hash consistency and validation tables; no independent replication or vendor reference image.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://arxiv.org/html/2605.11040v1 (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwarePrimary hardware researchDemonstrationprimary-siemens-root-of-trust-2023Siemens S7-1500 immutable-root-of-trust weakness and hardware revisions91/100
Bounded outcome
Original research describes boot-image replacement and protected-boot bypass; Siemens confirms the hardware root-of-trust issue and identifies newer fixed hardware for selected CPU types.
Stated claim
Siemens S7-1500 immutable-root-of-trust weakness and hardware revisions
Evidence status
Published research demonstration (published_research_demonstration)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: Affected Siemens SIMATIC/SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU product variants Configuration: CVE-2022-38773. Vendor SSA-482757 V1.5, updated 2025-01-14, enumerates product-specific affected versions and replacement hardware.

Access required

Physical tampering with affected PLC hardware and storage/peripheral trust paths.

Scope / hardware boundary
CVE-2022-38773. Vendor SSA-482757 V1.5, updated 2025-01-14, enumerates product-specific affected versions and replacement hardware.
Dates
Published: 10 January 2023 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date precision: day.
Mechanisms
ROM/NVRAM Data Extraction or Modification; Peripheral Data Bus Interception

Sources

Limitations

  • Affected product lists are not interchangeable with the entire S7-1500 family.
  • Hardware replacement/fix availability is product-specific; a firmware-only repair should not be assumed.
  • No evidence of field exploitation is established by this research.
  • Research-strand review status: AI-assisted desk review; no physical reproduction or independent human acceptance claimed.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Read both original disclosure and current retrieved Siemens advisory V1.5.
  • Checked the current versioned ICS technique definition before the analyst cross-reference.

Result

  • Vendor confirmation, fixed-hardware distinctions and taxonomy-version changes are retained.

Unresolved / next

  • Confirm exact target hardware, firmware, access and mitigation state before any separate authorized assessment.

Evidence confidence · 91/100

Confidence components for primary-siemens-root-of-trust-2023
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance20/20Original source and provenance inspected.
Technical evidence32/35Technical evidence read; methods and outcome limits retained.
Configuration specificity19/20Device and configuration details are bounded; missing revisions remain unknown.
Independent corroboration11/15Independent corroboration is limited; taxonomy citation and same-team artifacts are not independent reproduction.
Follow-up resolution9/10Follow-up source checks performed; unresolved items remain explicit.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://redballoonsecurity.com/siemens-discovery/ (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwareCommunity discussionReported resultLRRK-COM-008Shark robot-vacuum customization reports with redacted evidence and model ambiguity45/100
Bounded outcome
Surviving logs contain first-person progress reports and a linked custom-sound video, but substantial supporting material was removed. The ADB discussion separately reports an unauthorized connection, not working ADB access.
Stated claim
The author reports partial eMMC acquisition, root access, remote-shell enablement and custom sounds on robot-vacuum hardware.
Evidence status
Author report with redacted evidence (author_report_with_redacted_evidence)
Device, firmware & configuration

Project description: Shark RV1001 Linked demo title: Shark RV1100 Scope: Model names conflict; do not infer a shared vulnerability across the product family.

Access required

Author's laboratory access to robot mainboards and physical servicing/programming interfaces; exact decisive path is not fully documented in surviving content.

Scope / hardware boundary
Model names conflict; do not infer a shared vulnerability across the product family.
Dates
Published: 30 May 2022 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date is the earliest reviewed surviving log, not a verified project creation date. Later logs and public discussion checked through August 2022.
Mechanisms
nonvolatile memory readout; physical device interfaces

Sources

Limitations

  • No original firmware dumps, unredacted method, complete configuration or independent reproduction was reviewed.
  • Linked video was discovered but not independently watched/validated.
  • Do not infer an exposed privileged UART or debug bypass from normal serial wiring alone.

Follow-up

Actions performed

  • Read the surviving dated logs and public comments.
  • Checked whether device visibility was being confused with authorized ADB access.
  • Recorded redactions without seeking removed files or reconstructing deleted material.

Results

  • Identified RV1001/RV1100 ambiguity and incomplete evidence.
  • A publisher comment independently confirms receiving a takedown notice; it does not independently corroborate the technical attack.

Contradictions

  • Project description and linked video use different model names.
  • Reported ADB device presence remains unauthorized in the cited log.

Follow-up limitations

  • No original firmware dumps, unredacted method, complete configuration or independent reproduction was reviewed.
  • Linked video was discovered but not independently watched/validated.
  • Do not infer an exposed privileged UART or debug bypass from normal serial wiring alone.

Evidence confidence · 45/100

Confidence components for LRRK-COM-008
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance16/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Technical evidence14/35Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Configuration specificity8/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Independent corroboration0/15Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Follow-up resolution7/10Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.

Overall rationale First-party historical logs support a limited report; redactions, absent artifacts and model ambiguity substantially limit confidence.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://hackaday.io/project/185493-shark-robot-vacuum-reverse-engineering (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

Lead registry

Leads are sources not yet admitted as reviewed records. They carry no confidence score — null, not zero risk. 5 are pending or unresolved; 20 lead reviews are closed and listed separately.

Closed lead reviews

Pending or unresolved leads (5)
  • primary-lead-iommu-2010 Exploiting an I/OMMU vulnerability (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Companion original-source evidence materially narrows the mechanism, but neither the SSTIC paper nor the existing 2018 Dell paper silently resolves the unread IEEE 5665798 original.

    Next check: Compare a normally accessible original IEEE manuscript with the SSTIC account if one becomes available. Retain publication/experiment lineage and avoid counting both venues as independent proof without distinct outcomes.

  • DR-L06 2011 Predator/Reaper support-computer malware: conflicting public accounts (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Read additional contemporary Dark Reading coverage quoting the Air Force account: malware was described as a nuisance on a standalone mission-support network, with aircraft control reportedly unaffected. Repeated quotations are one statement chain, not independent forensic evidence. The original AF Space Command press record remains unlocated.

    Next check: Locate a normal public original AF Space Command record or authenticated official archival copy before resolving the competing accounts; retain as context, not a hardware-attack demonstration.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-001 STM32F103 voltage-glitch Reddit discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Three new targeted public origin-discovery queries, in addition to the three retained follow-up01 queries, did not establish a public original-author artifact attributable to the supplied Reddit post. The known unsupported Reddit URL was not resubmitted and no mirror was used. Search snippets and unrelated STM32-family studies remain discovery only.

    Next check: A normally accessible original-author artifact with a defensible identity connection to this post is required before claim review. Do not retry or mirror the restricted source.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-002 EEVblog STM32F4 level-2 protection discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    New captures of the first three forum pages were reviewed with the reused last-page capture. Earlier success assertions do not establish F4 RDP2: one contributor explicitly says F4 was untested and cannot identify the F3 model involved. The later RDP2 assertion still lacks an exact tested F4 part/revision, protection-state evidence and a retained validated result. Searches returned only the known assertion and the already published FEV RDP1 article.

    Next check: Require an original F4/RDP2 configuration and validated result, or a normally accessible original correction. Reconcile the uncertain ST operation before any decision to retry it; no bypass or unrequested paid repeat.

  • LRRK-LEAD-HOBOT-2026 HOBOT S7 Pro: author-reported OTA data writes need an installation-boundary follow-up (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source reviewed installation boundary gap · Confidence: not scored

    The original paper reports unauthenticated OTA data writes using non-destructive payloads. A data-transfer characteristic accepting writes does not by itself prove firmware-image installation, activation or bypass of a later signature check. Official TID-211 requires an installation/authentication boundary, so no admitted TID-211 case is proposed.

    Next check: Review a normally accessible original artifact or follow-up documenting the on-device verification/installation state, or a vendor security response; do not operate a robot or attempt firmware writes.

How to read evidence confidence

LRRK analyst evidence confidence, 0–100. Evidence strength for the narrowly stated claim, not probability, severity, present-device applicability, safety or an official MITRE score. It is an analyst rubric, not a MITRE rating.

  • Provenance · up to 20
  • Technical evidence · up to 35
  • Configuration specificity · up to 20
  • Independent corroboration · up to 15
  • Follow-up resolution · up to 10

Null means the source strand provided no separate component reason. Overall rationale is retained; no reasons are invented.

Multiple citations, reposts, same-team artifacts or shared reports are not independent reproduction.

Method, attribution and licenses

Edition
2026-11-01.3 · schema 1 · reviewed through 1 November 2026
Review
AI-assisted public-source desk research. No LRRK physical reproduction, device actuation or independent human acceptance is asserted.
Read status
Reviewed means the research strand inspected the returned source material. Partial-page reads, targeted passages, omitted forum replies and blocked content remain explicit.
Classification
evidenceStatus preserves each strand's original label. evidenceGroup is a coarse compiler grouping and never upgrades the stated outcome.
Mechanisms
Community mechanism labels are preserved. When a strand supplied no separate list, mapped EMB3D threat names are used; an empty list is not proof of no mechanism.
Mapping attribution
officialCaseAttribution=false means no verified direct MITRE attribution of this exact case is asserted. Ambiguous official-evidence inventory labels are displayed as analyst inference and their original wording is retained in mapping provenance. Only source-reviewed direct references or explicitly labeled analyst inferences. No forced EMB3D-to-ATT&CK/ICS crosswalk or MITRE endorsement.
Coverage and gaps
A documented seed corpus with open gaps, not an exhaustive census of the internet. Normal interfaces, search excerpts, HTTP success and code availability do not themselves prove attacks.
Shared sources
Records describe distinct claims or contexts. Shared papers, reports, forum topics and related artifacts do not establish independent experiments. 16 shared-source groups are flagged on their records.
What this does not establish
This snapshot does not establish exploitation on any current LRRK device. Operational reports, advisories, demonstrations, unverified reports and discussions remain distinct.
Updates
Research is reviewed weekly (Mondays, 9 AM Pacific) into private drafts. Only meaningful changes are prepared, and nothing is published automatically; this page changes only when a new reviewed edition is released. It is not a live feed.
Pinned versions
MITRE EMB3D™ site 2.0.2, model 2.0.1, commit 0d7c25bb4e2928c516fb5811aaab9ff8bab2896c (repository (opens original source in a new tab)). MITRE ATT&CK® v20.0 (13 October 2026), verified through 1 November 2026 (ATT&CK (opens original source in a new tab)).
Independence
An independent LrrK implementation. Not produced, reviewed or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation. Original sources retain their own rights; this library links to them and summarises bounded findings.
MITRE EMB3D license and disclaimers

©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. Terms of Use LICENSE The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use, copy, and create derivative works of EMB3D™ for internal business purposes or commercial use. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation and this license in any such copy and provide MITRE notice of such use at EMB3D@mitre.org. “©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.” For all other uses of EMB3D™, contact MITRE at techtransfer@mitre.org. All rights not expressly granted are hereby reserved. Portions of EMB3D™ were produced for the U.S. Government under various contracts or funded by internal research and development funds and the U.S. Government retains certain rights in EMB3D™. You agree that you shall not include a charge for EMB3D™ in any sales or license of derivative products or services to the U.S. Government. Your use of MITRE’s website and EMB3D™ will comply with all relevant laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and other obligations. DISCLAIMERS MITRE does not claim EMB3D™ enumerates all possibilities for the types of actions and behaviors documented as part of EMB3D™’s adversary model and framework of techniques. Using the information contained within EMB3D™ to address or cover full categories of techniques will not guarantee full defensive coverage as there may be undisclosed techniques or variations on existing techniques not documented by EMB3D™. EMB3D™ AND ALL DOCUMENTS AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” BASIS AND THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE MITRE CORPORATION, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES, DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION THEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ACCURACY, NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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