Assess

Independent LrrK research · Edition 2026-11-01.3

Hardware Attack Library (HAL)

Hardware-first evidence for drones, robotics and embedded devices: what researchers actually showed, on which device, with what access, and what stayed unresolved. Records are organised by the hardware threat classes in MITRE EMB3D™, with ATT&CK® cross-references only where a source supports them. LrrK endorses this framework as an independent effort of the security research community and is not affiliated with or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation.

89 reviewed evidence records · 5 pending leads · 20 closed lead reviews (15 resolved to records, 3 reviewed as context only, 2 reviewed and excluded) · reviewed through 1 November 2026. Context-only reviews are background, not demonstrated attacks. Several records share a paper or experiment, so these are not 89 independent attacks. Coverage means representation in this documented corpus — not every device, attack or source on the internet.

EMB3D Framework

Counts are records in this documented corpus, including discussions and reported results; they are not independent experiments, exhaustive coverage or confirmed device applicability. Choose a threat to filter the evidence.

Reviewed evidence records

Showing 3 of 89 reviewed records for EMB3D TID-101 Power Consumption Analysis Side Channel. Default order: hardware, then device interface, then context; within each, drones and robotics first, then fault-injection learning.

Full archived edition (JSON) ↓
HardwarePrimary hardware researchDemonstrationLRRK-20261101-PRI-001Arduino Uno round-1 AES-128 power analysis in a white-box laboratory implementation77/100
Bounded outcome
The authors report recovering the complete 16-byte test key with both methods; CPA produced clearer interpretation in their comparison. The article identifies alignment and implementation knowledge as barriers when transferring the result to black-box devices.
Stated claim
DPA and CPA can recover the test AES-128 key from power leakage of the specified implementation.
Evidence status
Published research demonstration white box (published_research_demonstration_white_box)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: Arduino Uno using an ATmega328P and author-controlled AES round-1 code Configuration: AddRoundKey and SubBytes operations implemented for the experiment; instrumented power observation with Keysight MSOX4104A. This is a white-box target with an author-controlled capture trigger, rather than a tested commercial black-box cryptographic product.

Access required

Physical power-observation instrumentation and repeated operations on an author-programmed device; the white-box trigger and known implementation are prerequisites of this demonstration.

Scope / hardware boundary
Arduino Uno/ATmega328P, the tested round-1 implementation and laboratory observability only; no arbitrary AES product, complete deployed protocol, robot or drone compromise is demonstrated.
Dates
Published: 19 September 2016 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Published online 19 September 2016; the publisher PDF cites the 2017 journal issue 1(2), pages 88–107. No separate experiment date established.
Mechanisms
Power Consumption Analysis Side Channel

Sources

Limitations

  • No independent replication was reviewed; the repository abstract and mirror are two access routes to one study.
  • The experiment implements two first-round operations and supplies capture assistance; black-box transfer was discussed rather than demonstrated.
  • No circuit, firmware or production-device version beyond the source's stated platform was established.
  • Partial PDF extraction is recorded rather than promoted to a complete-paper read.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Matched the accessible article to the institutional repository using title, authors, DOI and online date.
  • Inspected the actual tested code scope and white-box limitations.
  • Compared against published primary-dpa-1999; this is a different implementation and study.

Result

  • Original Arduino study is now supported beyond its abstract, with laboratory and implementation limits retained.

Unresolved / next

  • A separate assessment would need the exact device implementation, observability and countermeasures; no target applicability is inferred here.

Evidence confidence · 77/100

Confidence components for LRRK-20261101-PRI-001
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance19/20Institutional metadata matches the original authored article obtained through a public mirror; the mirror is not the publisher.
Technical evidence31/35Setup, successful bounded result and limitations were read; extraction is partial by page count.
Configuration specificity18/20Chip, laboratory observability and partial AES implementation are explicit; exact firmware revision is not established.
Independent corroboration0/15No independently executed reproduction was reviewed; two copies of one study count once.
Follow-up resolution9/10The previously missing article body was obtained and the key white-box-to-black-box limitation resolved.

Overall rationale LrrK analyst confidence in this bounded public evidence account; not probability, severity, device applicability, an official MITRE score, or LrrK bench verification.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://doi.org/10.1080/23742917.2016.1231523 (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwarePrimary hardware researchDemonstrationprimary-dpa-1999Differential Power Analysis against DES implementations65/100
Bounded outcome
Authors report recovering secret keys from implementation-dependent power leakage; this establishes a mechanism, not compromise of an arbitrary present-day device.
Stated claim
Differential Power Analysis against DES implementations
Evidence status
Published research demonstration (published_research_demonstration)
Device, firmware & configuration

Description: Smart-card cryptographic implementations; product identities largely undisclosed Configuration: Original paper illustrates DES power traces and differential analysis; exact commercial device revisions are not established.

Access required

Physical power-observation access and repeated cryptographic operations; laboratory instrumentation.

Scope / hardware boundary
Original paper illustrates DES power traces and differential analysis; exact commercial device revisions are not established.
Dates
Published: 1999 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — Publication date precision: year.
Mechanisms
Power Consumption Analysis Side Channel

Sources

Limitations

  • Supplemental foundational primary evidence; the exact Arduino AES paper cited by EMB3D did not return substantive body content.
  • No independent reproduction or present-day product applicability was verified.
  • Research-strand review status: AI-assisted desk review; no physical reproduction or independent human acceptance claimed.

Follow-up

Performed

  • Read the original public evidence and compared its scope to the official threat reference.

Result

  • Source review supports the bounded account; no LrrK physical reproduction was performed.

Unresolved / next

  • Confirm exact target hardware, firmware, access and mitigation state before any separate authorized assessment.

Evidence confidence · 65/100

Confidence components for primary-dpa-1999
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance20/20Original source and provenance inspected.
Technical evidence30/35Technical evidence read; methods and outcome limits retained.
Configuration specificity9/20Device and configuration details are bounded; missing revisions remain unknown.
Independent corroboration3/15Independent corroboration is limited; taxonomy citation and same-team artifacts are not independent reproduction.
Follow-up resolution3/10Follow-up source checks performed; unresolved items remain explicit.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://paulkocher.com/doc/DifferentialPowerAnalysis.pdf (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

HardwareCommunity discussionDiscussionLRRK-COM-006STM32F415 hardware-AES discussion and an unresolved later reproduction53/100
Bounded outcome
The discussion is useful background and contains a first-party historical partial-recovery claim, but the later participant does not demonstrate successful key recovery.
Stated claim
Maintainer replies describe attacks on unmasked hardware AES and prior partial key recovery. A later participant's reproduction remains unresolved in the thread.
Evidence status
Discussion maintainer claim and unresolved reproduction (discussion_maintainer_claim_and_unresolved_reproduction)
Device, firmware & configuration

Target: STM32F415 hardware AES discussed; CW308 STM32F4 setup in later posts Scope: Educational/vendor-support context.

Access required

Physical laboratory power-trace acquisition and access to the target test interface.

Scope / hardware boundary
Educational/vendor-support context.
Dates
Published: 12 February 2021 · Reviewed: 1 November 2026 — All 23 visible posts checked, including follow-ups through 2025-02-04.
Mechanisms
power side-channel analysis

Sources

  • forum.newae.com (opens original source in a new tab) · Public forum original discussion · Partially read 1 November 2026
    • First 20 of 23 public topic-stream posts; three remaining IDs retrieved separately.

    Supports: Maintainer leakage-model explanation and limited historical recovery claim.

  • forum.newae.com (opens original source in a new tab) · Public forum final replies · Partially read 1 November 2026
    • All three previously omitted post IDs retrieved; no successful final reproduction.

    Supports: Latest participant still reports incorrect results and asks whether the installed chip might be non-original.

Limitations

  • No raw trace dataset or recovered-key verification was reviewed.
  • No independent exact-configuration reproduction.
  • No counterfeit, implant or malicious-supply-chain finding can be inferred from the unanswered chip question.

Follow-up

Actions performed

  • Retrieved both the initial public JSON topic and all remaining post IDs.
  • Checked whether the 2025 discussion ended with a successful reproduction.

Results

  • No successful 2025 reproduction is shown.
  • A participant's question about a possibly non-original chip is speculation, not evidence of supply-chain tampering.

Contradictions

  • A participant's statement that needed data is impossible to obtain is disputed by the maintainer; applicability depends on the actual system interface.

Follow-up limitations

  • No raw trace dataset or recovered-key verification was reviewed.
  • No independent exact-configuration reproduction.
  • No counterfeit, implant or malicious-supply-chain finding can be inferred from the unanswered chip question.

Evidence confidence · 53/100

Confidence components for LRRK-COM-006
ComponentScoreReason
Provenance16/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Technical evidence13/35Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Configuration specificity15/20Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Independent corroboration0/15Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.
Follow-up resolution9/10Unavailable — no separate reason was recorded.

Overall rationale Primary support discussion supplies technical context, but the empirical claim is limited and the later reproduction is unresolved.

Framework mappings

Original record: https://forum.newae.com/t/stm32f415-hardware-crypto/2295 (opens original source in a new tab) · Share: link to this record

Lead registry

Leads are sources not yet admitted as reviewed records. They carry no confidence score — null, not zero risk. 5 are pending or unresolved; 20 lead reviews are closed and listed separately.

Closed lead reviews

Pending or unresolved leads (5)
  • primary-lead-iommu-2010 Exploiting an I/OMMU vulnerability (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Companion original-source evidence materially narrows the mechanism, but neither the SSTIC paper nor the existing 2018 Dell paper silently resolves the unread IEEE 5665798 original.

    Next check: Compare a normally accessible original IEEE manuscript with the SSTIC account if one becomes available. Retain publication/experiment lineage and avoid counting both venues as independent proof without distinct outcomes.

  • DR-L06 2011 Predator/Reaper support-computer malware: conflicting public accounts (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Read additional contemporary Dark Reading coverage quoting the Air Force account: malware was described as a nuisance on a standalone mission-support network, with aircraft control reportedly unaffected. Repeated quotations are one statement chain, not independent forensic evidence. The original AF Space Command press record remains unlocated.

    Next check: Locate a normal public original AF Space Command record or authenticated official archival copy before resolving the competing accounts; retain as context, not a hardware-attack demonstration.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-001 STM32F103 voltage-glitch Reddit discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    Three new targeted public origin-discovery queries, in addition to the three retained follow-up01 queries, did not establish a public original-author artifact attributable to the supplied Reddit post. The known unsupported Reddit URL was not resubmitted and no mirror was used. Search snippets and unrelated STM32-family studies remain discovery only.

    Next check: A normally accessible original-author artifact with a defensible identity connection to this post is required before claim review. Do not retry or mirror the restricted source.

  • LRRK-COM-LEAD-002 EEVblog STM32F4 level-2 protection discussion (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source review gap retained · Confidence: not scored

    New captures of the first three forum pages were reviewed with the reused last-page capture. Earlier success assertions do not establish F4 RDP2: one contributor explicitly says F4 was untested and cannot identify the F3 model involved. The later RDP2 assertion still lacks an exact tested F4 part/revision, protection-state evidence and a retained validated result. Searches returned only the known assertion and the already published FEV RDP1 article.

    Next check: Require an original F4/RDP2 configuration and validated result, or a normally accessible original correction. Reconcile the uncertain ST operation before any decision to retry it; no bypass or unrequested paid repeat.

  • LRRK-LEAD-HOBOT-2026 HOBOT S7 Pro: author-reported OTA data writes need an installation-boundary follow-up (opens original source in a new tab)

    Source reviewed installation boundary gap · Confidence: not scored

    The original paper reports unauthenticated OTA data writes using non-destructive payloads. A data-transfer characteristic accepting writes does not by itself prove firmware-image installation, activation or bypass of a later signature check. Official TID-211 requires an installation/authentication boundary, so no admitted TID-211 case is proposed.

    Next check: Review a normally accessible original artifact or follow-up documenting the on-device verification/installation state, or a vendor security response; do not operate a robot or attempt firmware writes.

How to read evidence confidence

LRRK analyst evidence confidence, 0–100. Evidence strength for the narrowly stated claim, not probability, severity, present-device applicability, safety or an official MITRE score. It is an analyst rubric, not a MITRE rating.

  • Provenance · up to 20
  • Technical evidence · up to 35
  • Configuration specificity · up to 20
  • Independent corroboration · up to 15
  • Follow-up resolution · up to 10

Null means the source strand provided no separate component reason. Overall rationale is retained; no reasons are invented.

Multiple citations, reposts, same-team artifacts or shared reports are not independent reproduction.

Method, attribution and licenses

Edition
2026-11-01.3 · schema 1 · reviewed through 1 November 2026
Review
AI-assisted public-source desk research. No LRRK physical reproduction, device actuation or independent human acceptance is asserted.
Read status
Reviewed means the research strand inspected the returned source material. Partial-page reads, targeted passages, omitted forum replies and blocked content remain explicit.
Classification
evidenceStatus preserves each strand's original label. evidenceGroup is a coarse compiler grouping and never upgrades the stated outcome.
Mechanisms
Community mechanism labels are preserved. When a strand supplied no separate list, mapped EMB3D threat names are used; an empty list is not proof of no mechanism.
Mapping attribution
officialCaseAttribution=false means no verified direct MITRE attribution of this exact case is asserted. Ambiguous official-evidence inventory labels are displayed as analyst inference and their original wording is retained in mapping provenance. Only source-reviewed direct references or explicitly labeled analyst inferences. No forced EMB3D-to-ATT&CK/ICS crosswalk or MITRE endorsement.
Coverage and gaps
A documented seed corpus with open gaps, not an exhaustive census of the internet. Normal interfaces, search excerpts, HTTP success and code availability do not themselves prove attacks.
Shared sources
Records describe distinct claims or contexts. Shared papers, reports, forum topics and related artifacts do not establish independent experiments. 16 shared-source groups are flagged on their records.
What this does not establish
This snapshot does not establish exploitation on any current LRRK device. Operational reports, advisories, demonstrations, unverified reports and discussions remain distinct.
Updates
Research is reviewed weekly (Mondays, 9 AM Pacific) into private drafts. Only meaningful changes are prepared, and nothing is published automatically; this page changes only when a new reviewed edition is released. It is not a live feed.
Pinned versions
MITRE EMB3D™ site 2.0.2, model 2.0.1, commit 0d7c25bb4e2928c516fb5811aaab9ff8bab2896c (repository (opens original source in a new tab)). MITRE ATT&CK® v20.0 (13 October 2026), verified through 1 November 2026 (ATT&CK (opens original source in a new tab)).
Independence
An independent LrrK implementation. Not produced, reviewed or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation. Original sources retain their own rights; this library links to them and summarises bounded findings.
MITRE EMB3D license and disclaimers

©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. Terms of Use LICENSE The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use, copy, and create derivative works of EMB3D™ for internal business purposes or commercial use. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation and this license in any such copy and provide MITRE notice of such use at EMB3D@mitre.org. “©2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.” For all other uses of EMB3D™, contact MITRE at techtransfer@mitre.org. All rights not expressly granted are hereby reserved. Portions of EMB3D™ were produced for the U.S. Government under various contracts or funded by internal research and development funds and the U.S. Government retains certain rights in EMB3D™. You agree that you shall not include a charge for EMB3D™ in any sales or license of derivative products or services to the U.S. Government. Your use of MITRE’s website and EMB3D™ will comply with all relevant laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and other obligations. DISCLAIMERS MITRE does not claim EMB3D™ enumerates all possibilities for the types of actions and behaviors documented as part of EMB3D™’s adversary model and framework of techniques. Using the information contained within EMB3D™ to address or cover full categories of techniques will not guarantee full defensive coverage as there may be undisclosed techniques or variations on existing techniques not documented by EMB3D™. EMB3D™ AND ALL DOCUMENTS AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” BASIS AND THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE MITRE CORPORATION, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES, DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION THEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ACCURACY, NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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MITRE ATT&CK license

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